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Brodie: Labor Relations

STATE PUBLIC UTILITY LABOR RELATIONS
DONALD

W. BRODIE*

INTRODUCTION

T

HE STATE LEVEL

public utility commission or comparable regulatory

agency (hereinafter referred to as commission) is largely responsible
for setting the rates consumers must pay for regulated goods and services and
is responsible for monitoring the quality of those goods and services. Labor
and labor-related costs may be a significant portion of the rates. In the
exercise of its rate and service jurisdiction, the commissions make decisions
which will have direct or indirect effects on labor relations. It is the purpose
of this paper to examine those effects by reviewing how the commissions
treat issues involving labor relations.' The emphasis will be upon the decisions of the various state-level commissions. A few references will reflect
federal commission decisions, as well as state and federal judicial decisions.
The definition of the phrase "public utility" can raise many serious
questions,' but for present purposes, a public utility simply means a company
subject to the regulation of a state-level public utility commission or equivalent state-level agency. In the majority of cases cited here, a public utility
may be publicly
will be an investor-owned enterprise, although some utilities
3
regulation.
commission
to
subject
be
still
owned and
The primary responsibility for the management of a public utility lies
with the directors and executives. 4 They make the decisions affecting the
labor relations of the utility either unilaterally, or after bilateral bargaining
with a union. The commission is neither a financial "super-executive" nor
a "super board" of directors.5
The commissions are under two major constraints which restrict their

authority to make decisions directly affecting labor relations. The commis* Professor of Law, University of Oregon School of Law; B.A., University of Washington;
J.D., New York University.
I For discussions written prior to the major decisions of the United States Supreme Court
on preemption, see Updegraft, Public Utility Labor Problems, 33 IowA L. REV. 609 (1948);
Note, Jurisdiction of Rate Regulatory Commissions Over Utility Wages, 36 VA. L. Rv.

372 (1950).
Compare Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934), and Hertz Corp. v. Heltzel, 217
Or. 205, 342 P.2d 1063 (1959).
3 See, e.g., Wheeling v. Renick, 145 W. Va. 640, 116 S.E.2d 763 (1960); Town of Morris2

town, 7 P.U.R.4th 306 (N.J. Bd. of Pub. Util. Comm'rs 1974).
4 E.g., New Jersey Bell Tel. Co., 24 P.U.R.3d 181,

186 (N.J. Bd. of Pub. Util. Comm'rs

1958).
5

E.g., Myers v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 164 Pa. Super. 431, 433, 65 A.2d 256
(1949).
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sions generally lack authorization to formulate labor policies, fix wages,
arbitrate labor disputes, or regulate employment practices. 6 The statutory
authority given to the commissions encompasses such matters as rates, management efficiency, safety, and quality of service." Despite the lack of
statutory authorization, clear lines of separation cannot be drawn between
rates, on the one hand, and such aspects of labor relations as wages, on the
other. For example, as wages increase, rates may also have to increase
to cover the wage payments. It is the burden of the commission to exercise
their limited statutory authority without unduly intruding into areas beyond
that authorization.
The second major restriction on commission regulation of labor relations is federal legislation, specifically the National Labor Relations Act,8
(NLRA), preempting those aspects of labor relations which would otherwise
fall under commission control. Specifically, in the utilities field, the United
States Supreme Court has noted that Congress has closed to state regulation
the field of peaceful strikes for higher wages from public utilities.
No distinction between public utilities and national manufacturing
organizations has been drawn in the administration of the Federal Act,
and when separate treatment for public utilities was urged upon
Congress in 1947, the suggested differential was expressly rejected.'
In that case, the state had enacted legislation which would have had the
effect of limiting or precluding the use of strikes against public utilities. The
legislation was struck down. In a related case," ° the United States Supreme
Court said:
Collective bargaining, with its right to strike at its core, is the essence
of the federal scheme ....
[A] state law which denies that right cannot
stand under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution."
Thus, the Court has enunciated a broad doctrine of preemption affecting
state efforts to control labor relations in public utilities. State legislation and
the exercise of commission authority are precluded from operating in a
6 E.g., Mission Coalition Organization v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 94 P.U.R.3d 405, 407
(Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1972). See also NAACP v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 5
Pa. Commw. 312, 290 A.2d 704 (1972).
7 See A. PRIEST, I PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 25-33 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as PRIEST].
8 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-528 (1970). Leading cases dealing with federal preemption of state labor
laws include: Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975);
San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
9 Railway & Motor Coach Employees, Div. 998 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd.,
340 U.S. 383, 391-92 (1951). See Annot., 22 A.L.R.2d 894 (1952).
10 Railway & Motor Coach Employees, Div. 1287 v. Missouri, 374 U.S. 74 (1963).
11 Id. at 82.
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol10/iss2/2
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manner so as to infringe upon national labor policies.1 2 Privately-owned
public utilities, although subject to rate and service regulation, are to be
treated in the field of labor relations in the same manner as any other
privately-owned business under the NLRA. State legislation and commission
action are limited largely to public ownership and dealing with "emergency
conditions of public danger, violence, or disaster.""3
In carrying out its rate and service duties, the commission may also be
charged to advance the public interest."4 A number of different interests
can be identified: the consumer, the worker, the stockholder, the expressed
national labor policy, to name a few. The various interests may, at times,
complement one another and, at other times, conflict. Reference to the public
interest in such legislation however "is not a mere general reference to public
welfare," but must be the interests "shown by the context and purpose" of
the legislation.' The focus in regulatory matters must be upon the careful
definition of statutory purpose and agency action. It may be useful however,
to look also to a broader public interest. Labor relations in both the private
and public sector give rise to many important public concerns. It may be
useful to consider whether any lessons for these concerns can be learned
from the manner in which the commissions operate. Labor relations in the
public utility area may be viewed as an example of the interface of public
and private sector relations, with the interplay between free enterprise and
free collective bargaining on the one side, and regulation on the other side.
I. SUMMARY OF THE COMMISSION PROCESSES

Two types of commission activity are of primary concern. One is the
review of rates and the other is the review of service. Focusing on the first,
it is obvious that rate determination is a complex process involving difficult
questions of law and fact. It is also as much an art as a science, although the
emphasis is upon objective rate determination. The simplicity of the rate
formula 6 belies the difficulties that may arise."7 For present purposes, however, the full complexity of the matter need not be examined. The primary
rate concepts involved here are the test year and the consideration of wages,
For a summary of national labor policies, see Comment, Labor Policy and The Airlines'
Mutual Aid Pact, 1975 WASH. U. L. REV. 191, 195, n.18. See generally MORRIs, THE
12

DEVELOPING LABOR LAw

(1971).

is374 U.S. at 83.
14 PRIEST,

supra note 7, at 32.

United States v. Lowden, 308 U.S. 225, 230 (1939). See also NAACP v. Federal Power
Comm'n, 520 F.2d 432, 438 (D.C. Cir. 1975), afI'd, 96 S.Ct. 1806 (1976).
15

16

See W.

JONES, REGULATED INDUSTRIES, CASES AND MATERIALS

128-29 (1976).

17 See generally PRIEST, supra note 7; F. WELCH, PREPARING FOR THE UTILITY RATE CASE

Published
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salaries and fringe benefits as operating expenses. Utility rates are set prospectively, not retroactively. 8
Rate-making for a particular utility is in essence making a forecast of
its future financial status upon the basis of its known performance
during a span of time in the immediate past, viz, a "test period". 9
The value of the test period or test year is that
The actual experience of the company during the test period, both as
to revenues produced by the previously established rates and as to
operating expenses, is the basis for a reasonably accurate estimate of
what may be anticipated in the near future if, but only if, appropriate
pro forma adjustments are made for abnormalities which existed in the
test period and for changes occurring during the test period and therefore, not in operation throughout its entirety. (emphasis added.)"0
It can reasonably be assumed that certain operating expenses, such as wages,
salaries, and fringe benefits, which actually occurred during the test year,
will be paid during the future time for which the rates will be set. The past
test year 1 does not fully represent the future operating expenses, since wages,
salaries and fringe benefits may increase during the time the new rates will
be in effect. The issue then is raised as to whether the increase in these
operating expenses should be allowed or disallowed.
Known changes during and beyond the test year.. .normally are "rolled
back" into the test year so that the end results reasonably reflect the
operating conditions which will prevail during the period when the
22
new rates will first be in effect.
The emphasis here is upon the decision to allow or disallow increases in
wages, salaries, and fringe benefits for the future period for which the new
rates are being set. Obviously, not all expense increases will be automatically
translated into increased rates. For example, not all increases can be proved
with evidence satisfactory to the commission. Not all expenses will be included
in the test if they are not typical of the test year. Unusual or nonrecurring
' 8 E.g., Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 90 P.U.R.3d 172, 182 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1971).
"9Telephone Users Ass'n v. Public Service Comm'n, 304 A.2d 293, 297 (D.C. Ct. App.
1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 933 (1974).
20

Utilities Comm'n v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 285 N.C. 398, 417, 206 S.E.2d 283,

297 (1974),

quoting Utilities Comm'n v. Durham, 282 N.C. 308, 320, 193 S.E.2d 95, 104

(1972).
While not relevant for this purpose, the test year may be a future year. See Downs,
The Use of the Future Test Year in Utility Rate-Making, 52 B. U. L. REV. 791 (1972);
Gibbons, Some Legal Aspects of the Future Test Period in Utility Rate Regulation, 16
21

AR-zL.

REV.

947 (1974).

22 Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 95 P.U.R.3d 1, 12 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1972).
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol10/iss2/2
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expenses may be disallowed. The expenses allowed during the test year should
also be those common to a typical or average year."
Disallowance of increases in wages, salaries, or fringe benefits as operating expenses must be viewed in its rate context. Disallowance does not
necessarily connote disapproval of the expense or the contract. It means
only that the rate payers will not be charged for the expense." The disallowed
expense will then be paid from monies which might have been used for other
purposes, such as the payment of dividends to the stockholders.
In addition to setting rates, the second concern here will be with the
commission's responsibility for monitoring the quality of service rendered
by a utility.2" Rates and service may be related. A degraded level of service
at the same rate level as a previous higher level of service may be tantamount
to a rate increase. More importantly for these purposes, however, is the
point that the quality of service may be directly related to what the employees
do and how the employees do it. Since this may be subject to regulation, it
can be seen that the commission may have some direct or indirect authority
over working conditions. These same working conditions may also be an
important aspect of labor relations.
The decisions can be divided into three major categories: (1) those
having a primary emphasis on monetary considerations; (2) those having
a primary emphasis on personnel and working conditions; and (3) those
having a primary emphasis on negotiations and impasse. The categories are,
of course, not mutually exclusive, as can readily be seen. After a consideration of the cases, the implications of the cases will be considered, and finally,
attention will be given to whether some larger issues relevant to the public
interest in labor relations are raised.
II.

MONETARY ASPECTS

6

The cases cited as involving monetary aspects will be divided into
three subcategories: (A) wages; (B) salaries; (C) fringe benefits. Once
again, the three categories are not mutually exclusive, but they aid in the
analysis. The comparatively large number of cases in the category of wages
allows it to be further subdivided into subcategories: (1) those in which
the wages as an operating expense were generally allowed, and (2) those
in which they were generally disallowed. In each situation, the important
elements upon which attention will be focused are those which the commission
considered as having an impact on labor relations.
23
24
25

E.g., New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 84 P.U.R.3d 130, 163 (Mass. Dept. Pub. Util. 1970).
E.g., Reserve Tel. Co., Inc., 23 P.U.R.3d 307, 309 (La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1958).
See generally PRIEST, supra note 7, at 227-83.

Published
by IdeaExchange@UAkron,
1977
26 Generally,
the cases cited cover
the period in time from the mid-1950's to the present.
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It is important to keep in mind that the issue for the commission is the
allowance or disallowance of the expense. Although the language of the
decision may not always be clear, the approval or disapproval per se of the
wage clause in the contract is not particularly at issue. The basic issue is
whether to charge the expense to the ratepayers.
A-1 Wages: Factors When Expense Was Allowed
As might be expected, many of the cases merely pass on the operating
expenses of wages to the ratepayers with little or no discussion of the factors
used in the decision.27 Some cases simply note that the wages are in fact an
expense to be borne by the utility and must be paid. 8 These decisions do not
discuss the fact that not all expenses automatically are passed to ratepayers,
but practically speaking, it is true that most expenses are passed directly to
ratepayers. Uncertainty abounds where the burden of proof is placed in the
decisions. Some cases in this group appear to put the burden of proof on
those who seek to disallow the expense, and then find the burden not carried."9
The approach seems to be that whatever is not disproved must be deemed
proved. One commission went so far as to say that "any payment or benefit
given labor, in the absence of proof of bad faith, is presumptively a proper
expenditure for fixing rates."3 Some cases emphasize the fact of the newness
of the contract, and new contracts usually involve higher wages."' The
emphasis suggests that newness is treated as a reason for passing on an
expense. One point that this type of decision does reflect is that the rate
making process requires the exercise of a large element of judgment. The
summary conclusions often found in the decisions do not, however, reflect
what specific elements make up the judgmental decision. While no listing of
elements could turn the exercise of judgment into a scientific one, no party
is helped in succeeding cases where the basis of judgment is undisclosed.
Another group of decisions tend toward identifying a special factor
that is suggested as the basis of the decision. A reference to an undefined
27 See, e.g., New Citizens Tel. Co., 91

P.U.R.3d 461 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1971);

Carolina Power & Light Co., 88 P.U.R.3d 283 (N.C. Util. Comm'n 1971).
28E.g.,

Michigan Bell Tel., 94 P.U.R.3d

321,

332 (Mich.

Pub. Serv. Comm'n

1972).

See also Intermountain Gas Co., 86 P.U.R.3d 438 (Idaho Pub. Util. Comm'n 1970).
29
See, e.g., Wilmington Suburban Water Corp., 203 A.2d 817 (Del. Super. Ct. 1964),
modified, 211 A.2d 602 (Del. 1965); Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 8 P.U.R.4th 514
(Colo. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1974). But see Consolidated Edison Co., 98 P.U.R.3d 455

(N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1973)

(company

failed to sustain its burden of proof);

Wheeling Electric Co., 9 P.U.R.4th 448 (W. Va. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1975) (company
did not have burden of proving increased volume of sales would not offset increased wage
costs). See generally F. WELCH, CONDUCT OF THE UTILITY RATE CASE 203-07 (1955).
30 New York Tel. Co., 5 P.U.R.3d 33, 58 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1954).
3 E.g., Mississippi Power Co. v. Mississippi Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 291

So. 2d 541,

548

(Miss. 1974); General Tel. Co. v. Tennessee Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 7 P.U.R.4th 273, 282
(Tenn. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1974).
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol10/iss2/2
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public interest consideration may be used.3 2 The decision may look to traditional problems, such as regulatory lag and attrition, as part of the reason
to allow the expense. 3 Other actions unrelated to the wage increase, but
related to the general economic health of the utility, may play a role, such as
a large construction project, or the recessed state of the economy. 5
Another special factor which may be given weight is the implicit or
explicit approval under the periodic wage and price control legislation enacted
by the federal government. If the federal criteria are met, then the state
commission may be more inclined to allow the expense. 8 At times the
commission may approve the expense subject to a detailed review at a later
date." One clearly special factor may be that the utility, due to future shortages of gas, could not hope to recoup the expense through greater future
revenues because there was a clear limit on the amount of the product.'
The same rationale may be applied where the company's revenues are dropping because of consumer conservation. An unusual situation involved a
utility which calculated the cost of the contract and apparently expected to
lose. In rebuttal, the company re-evaluated the effects of the contract, and
the new figures were approved.. The foregoing is not intended to suggest
that the existence of a single special factor may suffice, but in the typically
brief commission decision, mention of special factors appears to play an
important role.
A great many cases are concerned with the issue of whether the increased
wage package is sufficiently proximate to the test year to be considered.
Wage increases that are close in time to the test year can be balanced against
anticipated increases in revenues or other operating savings. Income and
expense can be reasonably related to determine whether they will offset each
other or whether the wage increase results in increased expenses over revenues
that should be passed on to the ratepayer. As the effect of the wage increase
becomes increasingly distant from the test year, it becomes more difficult to
make the expense-revenue formula balance. When the wage expense is too
82 E.g.,
33

Potomac Elec. Power Co., 80 P.U.R.3d 527, 528 (D.C. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1969).
See, e.g., In re Hackensack Water Co., 57 NJ. Super. 180, 154 A.2d 212 (1959),

modified, 35 N.J. 239, 172 A.2d 651 (1961).
4
8 E.g.,

Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 9 P.U.R.4th 518 (Wyo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n

1975).

85

E.g., New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 23 P.U.R.3d 510 (Me. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1958).

86See, e.g., Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 1 P.U.R.4th 1 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
1973); Wisconsin Telephone Co., CCH UTIL. L. REP. 121,683 (Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
1971).
"7E.g., Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co-op, 3 P.U.R.4th 160 (Va. State Corp. Comm'n
1974).
ssE.g., Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co., 98 P.U.R.3d 229 (Ohio Pub. Util. Comm'n 1973).
39 Michigan
Consol. Gas Co., 1977
5 P.U.R.3d 449 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1954).
Published
by IdeaExchange@UAkron,
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far from the test year, the commission may disallow the expense for the
present time, and require the company to pursue it at some future point
when the expense-revenue balance can be more realistically made. As one
commissioner has said:
[W]here wage increases occur during a test period, all of the resultant
effects of it are known, and where there has been no increase in revenues or decrease in operating expenses sufficient to offset this effect,
an adjustment should be made to normalize the relationship between
investment, revenues and expenses....
The effect of a wage increase which will occur subsequent to the
test year . . . cannot be determined with any degree of accuracy in the
absence of corresponding evidence relating to revenues and expenses
. . .It may well be that changes in the number employed, growth in
revenues, and decreases in other operating expenses will tend to offset,
in whole or in part, the effect of the wage increase."0
The decisions look to several different factors to determine whether the
increased costs should be included in the test year expenses. One factor is
whether the costs become known as opposed to being speculative prior to
commission action. Where the costs would have a substantial impact and
are reduced to a certainty, the expense will be included.' Known changes
occurring within specified periods of time of the rate increase, such as six
months 2 or nine months," may be allowed. The greater the impact on the
expense picture, the more likely will be the inclusion of the out-of-period
but known increase, such as where the increases were the "largest" known and
the utility was the type where wages constitute a major portion of the total
operating expenses." Another factor to be considered is the effect of the
newly established return allowed the utility. Where the effect of exclusion
of the wage package expense might be to prevent the company from earning
the appropriate return, the commission may allow inclusion of the out of
period expense. " An important practical consideration is the effect of disallowing the expense. If the effect of not allowing the expense would be that
the utility would be making an immediate new application for a new hearing
because of increased expenses, the commission may allow the expense."
40 California Oregon Power Co., 35 P.U.R.3d 328, 336 (Ore. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1960).

"1E.g., Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., I P.U.R.4th 113 (Md. Pub. Serv. Cbmm'n 1973);
Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 3 P.U.R.4th 1 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1973).
42 E.g., Orange & Rockland Util., Inc., 3 P.U.R.4th 446 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1973).
"4E.g., Michigan Gas Util. Co., 7 P.U.R.4th 356 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1974).
"Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Bell Tel. Co., 93 P.U.R.3d 13 (Pa. Pub. Util.
Comm'n 1971).
45E.g., Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 1 P.U.R.3d 129 (Colo. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1953);
Manufacturers Light & Heat Co., 26 P.U.R.3d 463 (W. Va. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1958).
4"E.g., Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 1 P.U.R.3d 129 (Colo. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1953);
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol10/iss2/2
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On the other side of the coin, the expenses may be beyond the test year
and disallowed or not passed on to the ratepayers. The increased expense
may be simply too remote for proper calculation, such as where it was 16
months in the future. 7 Where a multi-year labor agreement is signed, the
wage increases for the first year may be included, but the expenses for the
second or third years excluded, so far as the present rate hearing is concerned.' 8 When the offsetting revenues cannot be known 9 or the expenses are
not representative of the future level of expenses,5" they may be disallowed.
A-2 Wages: FactorsWhen Expense Was Disallowed
A number of specific factors were used when the commissions disallowed
the wage expense, in addition to those mentioned above. The paramount
point to keep in mind is that the commission attempts to measure increases
in expenses against increases in revenues or against a reduction of expenses
in other categories." If the result is an even balance, the rates may not
increase because of the wage factor. If the anticipated revenues or other
operating efficiencies do not balance the increased expenses, an increase
in rates to cover the expenses can be anticipated. The decisions reflect rate
making considerations, as the commission does not fix wages as such."'
The decisions in cases disallowing the additional expense will be divided
into two categories. One category relates to personnel and management
decisions, encompassing such things as worker productivity or overtime. The
second category relates primarily to procedural considerations, such as where
speculative or contingency requests are involved.
In the first category of cases, increases in productivity play an important role.
The amount of allowable expense for increased wages should be reduced
by that amount which the company's experience shows to be the increase
in the level of labor's productivity.5"
Where a productivity gain can be shown, the rate effect of the wage increase
should be reduced accordingly. The Federal Power Commission has stated
that merit increases, for example, may be designed to reduce labor costs, "'

" E.g.,
48 E.g.,
4 E.g.,
50
E.g.,

New Haven Water Co., 6 P.U.R.4th 166 (Conn. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1974).
Gas Service Co., 100 P.U.R.3d 316 (Kan. State Corp. Comm'n 1973).
Potomac Edison Co., 6 P.U.R.4th 183 (W. Va. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1974).
Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 93 P.U.R.3d 361 (Md. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1972).

51 E.g., Union Elec. Co., 94 P.U.R.3d 87 (Fed. Power Comm'n 1972).
52

See, e.g., Skeedee Independent Tel. Co., v. Farm Bureau, 166 Neb. 49, 87 N.W.2d 715

(1958).
53 Narragansett Elec. Co., 93 P.U.R.3d 417, 442 (R.I. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1972).
Published
by IdeaExchange@UAkron,
51 Alabama-Tennessee
Natural1977
Gas Co., 44 P.U.R.3d 19, 36 (Fed. Power Comm'n 1962).
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and cost-control programs are an example of good management." Productivity increases may be difficult to demonstrate, and other factors may
overshadow this factor. Economic need56 or "galloping" inflation" may mean
wage payments are greater than productivity gains. Specific evidence of productivity increases or reasonable estimations thereof will be required. 8 The
commission at the state level may decline to impute, for example, productivity gains from the entire, nationwide Bell System." The evidence itself
may show an actual decline in productivity,"0 leading to a rate increase. The
issue of productivity may be a particularly difficult one for a state level
commission when it attempts to rule on intra-state rates while dealing with a
contract that was negotiated at the national level, as is the case in the Bell
System. One commissioner stated, on a related matter:
The commissioner is concerned about this type of negotiations as it
may affect Oregon ratepayers. Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone Company's pay scale for comparable jobs compared to pay scales of other
local area telephone companies are higher . . . Pacific Northwest
Bell Telephone Company's customers should not be bearing wage
expenses which are above the level of local area wages adjusted for
local conditions and consumer cost levels. 61
In addition to a productivity offset,6" other personnel and management
activities may be used to demonstrate that the wage increase does not amount
to an overall increase which should be passed on to the ratepayers. A wage
agreement sets an hourly rate or whatever, but it does not usually represent
a predetermined total economic package. One of the variables which can
increase or decrease the total amount of wage cost is the amount of overtime.
A commission may regard with skepticism a utility's claim for undiminished
overtime expenses in a new contract where the total workforce is also increasing."5 Excessive amounts of overtime may be rejected.6 ' The commission
may restrict the amount of overtime which it will allow for rate purposes,
55
E.g., Detroit Edison Co., 3 P.U.R.4th 209, 227 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1974).
See also Interstate Power Co., 97 P.U.R.3d 6 (Iowa State Commerce Comm'n 1972).
56
E.g., Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 100 P.U.R.3d 345 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1973).
57

E.g., Rhode Island Consumers' Council v. Archie Smith, 113 R.I. 232, 319 A.2d 643

(1974).
58 See Jamestown Tel. Corp., 97 P.U.R.3d 431 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1972); Narragansett Electric Co., 1 P.U.R.4th 60 (R.I. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1973).
59 Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 3 P.U.R.4th 1 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1973).
60
See, e.g., Sierra Pac. Power Co., 9 P.U.R.4th 537 (Fed. Power Comm'n 1975).
61 Pacific Northwest Bell Tel. Co., 92 P.U.R.3d 433, 449 (Ore. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1971).
62
But see Rhode Island Consumers' Council v. Archie Smith 113 R.I. 232, 236, 319 A.2d
643, 645 (1974), where the court stated:
[WIhile a utility rate increase may be permitted only if it reflects productivity gains,
it is not mandated with respect to wage and fringe benefit increases.
63E.g., Consolidated Edison Co., 98 P.U.R.3d 455, 465 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1973).
6, E.g., Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 100 P.U.R.3d 345, 355 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1973).
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol10/iss2/2
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such as limiting it to a four year average rather than the actual amount shown
in the test year.85 In other cases, the commission may admonish management
that the excesses of the past will not be tolerated in the future.6"
The character of the payroll personnel becomes an important item.
While increases in salary may be occurring, the overall salary expense may
be declining. 7 Where there is a declining number of employees under an
employee reduction program, a wage increase may not result in total labor
cost or rate increase. 8 Labor turnover is also a factor. Where the labor force
is made up of a large percentage of newly hired employees, their total salaries
will be proportionally less than the salaries of employees with more seniority.
Wage increases of the low seniority or skills levels will have less rate impact.8 8
A significant number of retirements of higher paid senior employees may
reduce the overall payroll despite a wage increase.70 Where the actual employment figure from the test year represents a higher than average figure,
substitution of the lesser average and more accurate figure may reduce the
claimed operating wage expense. 7 Where the claim for the wage is for an
employee not yet hired, and where there are no definite plans to hire, but
only speculation on the actual hiring, the claim may be disallowed."2 If the
unfilled position is an essential one, however, the wage or salary may be
allowed."3 In one of the peculiarities of utility regulation, certain kinds of
rate discrimination between ratepayers are prohibited.' Where the payment
of a higher wage in one part of a system results in increased costs for all
ratepayers of the company, such an unlawfully discriminatory wage will
be disallowed."1
65 New Haven Water Co., 7 P.U.R.4th 166, 175-76 (Conn. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1974).
66E.g., Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 57 P.U.R.3d 1, 24 (D.C. Pub. Serv. Comm'n

1964).
D.C. Transit, Inc. 72 P.U.R.3d 113, 126 (D.C. Metropolitan Area Transit Comm'n
1968).
68
E.g., Detroit Edison Co., 3 P.U.R.4th 209, 226-27 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1974);
Michigan Consol. Gas Co., 36 P.U.R.3d 289, 303 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1960).
69
E.g., Diamond State Tel. Co., 21 P.U.R.3d 417, 439 (Del. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1958);
United Tel. Co., 27 P.U.R.3d 128, 133 (Kan. State Corp. Comm'n 1958).
7
OE.g., D.C. Transit Sys., Inc., 81 P.U.R.3d 417, 427 (D.C. Metropolitan Area Transit
Comm'n 1969); New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 84 P.U.R.3d 130, 165 (Mass. Dep't of Pub.
Util. 1970).
7 E.g., New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 84 P.U.R.3d 130, 164-65 (Mass. Dep't of Pub. Util.
1970).
T2E.g., Parkville Water Co., 12 P.U.R.3d 239, 250 (Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm'r 1956).
7 E.g., Atlantic City Sewerage Co., 75 P.U.R.3d 455, 461 (N.J. Bd. of Pub. Util. Comm'rs
1968). However, where a company operates without filling a position normally filled by
other utilities, it cannot claim an expense for the usual, but unfilled position. Haslings v.
Village of Stowe, 57 P.U.R.3d 200, 206 (Vt. Pub. Serv. Bd. 1965).
7 See generally Lake, Discrimination By Railroads and Other Public Utilities-Preferences
to Patrons in a Given Locality, 25 N.C. L. REv. 273 (1974).
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In a unique case, the question of the need for as large a workforce as
was used was raised. In its original decision, the commission found that
the workforce was greatly in excess of the need, largely because of a collective bargaining dispute over transfers. The commission disallowed the expense
for non-productive labor in its first opinion, but on rehearing, without discussion, the expense was allowed."8
The second major category of cases involves procedural considerations
which may lead to a disallowance of the wage as an operating expense. A
maintenance wage expense will not be included in the test year where the
maintenance was not normally done in that year but should have been done
at an earlier time.77 Where a company has not adequately explained or supported its request, obviously the expense cannot be allowed." Where the
relationship between wage benefits and revenues has been constant despite
annual wage increases, the utility may have a more difficult task getting
approval of the expense." Commissions will refuse to allow an operating
expense where the wage increase is contingent upon the commission's approval of the expense for rate purposes.8 " Commissions have not allowed
speculative wage expenses which may be anticipated, but which have not
yet been realized, such as where the only evidence is that large wage increases
have frequently occurred in the past,8 ' or where forecasts of settlements are
speculative, 2 or where there are projections of the impact of inflation.8 Similarly, where the utility proposed increasing administrative overhead and
payroll expenses one hundred per cent because they were "extremely low",
the expense was rejected." Expenses for deferred wage increases dependent
upon an improved financial condition are also subject to rejection.8" Where
Milwaukee v. Milwaukee Gas Light Co., 9 P.U.R.3d 81, 86, 95 (Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
1955).
77
E.g., Pacific Northwest Bell Tel. Co., 100 P.U.R.3d 82, 90 (Ore. Pub. Util. Comm'n
1973).
78
E.g., Sierra Pac. Power Co., 7 P.U.R.4th 209, 225 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1974);
General Tel. Co. v. Tennessee Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 7 P.U.R.4th 273, 283 (Tenn. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n 1974).
79 E.g., Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 95 P.U.R.3d 339, 352-53 (D.C. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
1972); Potomac Electric Power Co., 64 P.U.R.3d 364, 369 (D.C. Pub. Serv. Commn'n
1966). But see New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Massachusetts Dep't of Pub. Util., 360
Mass.
443, 275 N.E.2d 493 (1971).
80
E.g., Airfield Service Co., 46 P.U.R.3d 246, 248-49 (Conn. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1962);
Florida Tel. Co., 76 P.U.R.3d 109, 110-11 n.6 (Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1968); Shreveport
Rys. Co., 2 P.U.R.3d 448 (La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1953); Greenfield Gas Light Co., 6
P.U.R.3d 303, 306 (Mass. Dep't of Pub. Util. 1953).
81 New York Tel. Co., 11 P.U.R.3d 320, 341 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1955).
82 Consolidated Edison Co., Inc., 41 P.U.R.3d 305, 363 (N.Y. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1961).
83
In re Central R.R. Co., 66 N.J. 12, 23, 327 A.2d 427, 433 (1974); Central Vermont
Public Service Corporation, 94 P.U.R.3d 34, 42 (Vt. Pub. Serv. Bd. 1972).
4
1 Berea College Elec. Util. Dep't, 72 P.U.R.3d 301, 303 (Ky.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1968).
85
1 llsborough & Montgomery Tel. Co., 14 P.U.R.3d 212, 216 (N.J. Bd. of Pub. Util.
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol10/iss2/2
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a federal wage control guideline is exceeded, the commission may disapprove
wages in excess of the guideline.86
The regulatory process is a slow process, with many potential delays.
At times a proposed wage adjustment will be made at the rebuttal stage of
the case, late in the proceedings. Unless the expense is simply accepted,
review and the consideration of offsetting revenue adjustment could greatly
prolong already protracted hearings. For reason of this lateness, the commission may reject the proposal.8" Occasionally, a commission will approve
an increase, but with the admonition that future wage increases should be
carefully scrutinized." The procedural admonition may serve its function,
but no recent case has reported details of such a follow-up.
On review of these cases which either allowed or disallowed the wage
expense for rate purposes, several points may be considered. The initial
premise is that the commission has no authority to approve or disapprove
the wage settlement, and no authority to interfere in the bargaining process.
The National Labor Relations Act has preempted the area. 9 It seems, in
many cases, however, that the line between the lack of commission jurisdiction over this aspect of labor relations and the common authority to allow
or disallow the wage expense is a very narrow line. In several cases, it was
seen that the commission was expressly asked by the parties to approve or
disapprove the wage proposal. The decisions reviewed indicate many problems with the evidence. It may be too speculative, too late, too little, or
otherwise difficult to understand. The placing of the evidentiary burden seems
unclear at times. It would seem desirable to have a higher level of justification for the wage increases in at least some of the cases. The commissions
might more often request testimony from both management and unions on
the matter, as has been done." The authority of the commissions to seek this
justification appears unquestioned. Certainly the commissions are to be
commended for balancing revenues and expenses, properly measuring productivity, and also for their analyses of the character of seniority and composition of the workforce. The rejection of speculative estimates, the rejection
of the attempted use of undefined general economic conditions such as con-

8

E.g., Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 100 P.U.R.3d 345, 355 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1973).
E.g., Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 96 P.U.R.3d 373, 379 (D.C. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
1972); Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 95 P.U.R.3d 339, 355 (D.C. Pub. Serv. Comm'n

87

1972).
8 E.g., Mountain Fuel Co., 76 P.U.R.3d 277, 313 (Utah Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1968).
89 See cases cited notes 9 & 10 supra.
90

E.g., Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 8 P.U.R.4th 514, 535 (Colo. Pub. Util. Comm'n
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tinuing inflation, and the careful scrutiny of the test year 1 are also commendable. While the United States Supreme Court has broadly construed the
area of preemption, the commissions properly look at many of the same
economic factors which concern utilities and labor in negotiating their contract. 2 Preemption does not preclude a sharing of areas of common and
immediate concern, it would appear. The distinction must be found in the
difference between approving or disapproving a wage agreement and approving or disapproving an operating expense for rate purposes.
B. Salaries
A review of the separate category of salaries, as opposed to wages, is
useful to demonstrate the degree of detailed review which the commissions
may exercise. While wages may be reviewed on the basis of productivity and
other factors, salaries may be measured by what the individual actually does,
including hours spent on the job. There are certain problems with the creation
of the category of decisions on salaries. The major problem is one of definition. While the cases treat salaries differently than wages, the definitions of the
two classes is not made clear. Many of the cases obviously involve the
salaries of executive personnel who are probably excluded from the coverage
of the NLRA.93 Not all of the cases are, however, completely clear. Many
of the decisions mention no obvious distinction between salaried supervisors
excluded from NLRA coverage and those salaried, but non-organized employees, who might be covered by Section Seven of the NLRA.9 ' The question
which is raised, but which cannot be answered on the basis of reported
decisions, is whether the commissions subject non-organized employees'
salaries to greater scrutiny than union-organized employees' wages. It is
clear that the analysis of salaries, however defined, is far greater in detail, than
the analysis of wages.
As in the wage area, the commissions have no authority to actually
limit the amount paid to an individual. The commission can only disallow
excess payments as an operating expense for rate making purposes.9 5 In
this regard, the investor-acting-as-manager utility may present a particular
A dissent warns of the problem of using a past test year for revenues and a future test
year for expenses. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Bell Tel. Co., 2 P.U.R.4th 417,
466 (Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1973) (Carter, Comn'r, dissenting).
92 It is acknowledged that the decisions are not always definitive as to when a collective
bargaining agreement is involved and when a nonunion wage is involved, but many do
speak of the agreement.
93
See 29 U.S.C. §§152(11), 157 (1970).
94 See, e.g., Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. California Pub. Util. Comm'n, 62 Cal. 2d 634, 401
P.2d 353, 44 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1965); Breaux Bridge Tel. Co., Inc., 25 P.U.R.3d 82 (La. Pub.
Serv. Cornm'n 1958).
5 E.g., Latourneau v. Citizens Util. Co., 125 Vt. 38, 46, 209 A.2d 307, 314 (1965); Broadview Util. Corp., 82 P.U.R.3d 195, 197 (Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1970); Virginia City
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol10/iss2/2
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question. Where major shareholders are also the executive officers, all of
the earnings could be paid as salary, with the effect that the utility would
never show a return on investment." Close attention should be given to the
salary question in those unique cases.
A variety of factors will be looked at in determining the propriety of the
salary payment. Among the factors are the time which the individual devotes
to the business of the particular utility," the nature and extent of administrative and general functions," whether "arms-length" bargaining is involved, " and the scope of the utility's business."' The salaries of executives in
other utilities may be used as a comparison, 1 ' but the particular salary must
be also viewed in the light of the ability of the particular utility itself to
pay. 2 Unique methods of payment not common in the industry, such as
the payment of salary and income taxes, are frowned upon. 1"' Wage increases
to employees may be a partial justification for salary increases to executives,
but an eight per cent wage increase does not justify a 38 percent management
salary increase.' 4
As is true in many other types of cases, a failure to meet the burden of
proof may result in a denial of a portion of the operating expense. The burden
of proof appears to lie upon the company, at least once the question of
propriety is raised."' Speculative estimates of future needs will be rejected
here as in the wage area."'
One difficult area is the payment of incentive bonuses to management as a reward for efficient performance. An analogous issue is raised when
rate of return is sought to be used as an incentive or punishment technique."'
One commission has stated: "Aside from the fact that management is being
96E.g., Mebone Home Tel. Co., 29 P.U.R.3d 222, 225 (N.C. Util. Comm'n

1959); West
Keansburg Water Co., 83 P.U.R.3d 423, 431 (N.J. Bd. of Pub. Util. Comm'rs 1970).
9 E.g., Forest Hills Util. Co., 91 P.U.R.3d 285, 292 (Ohio Pub. Util. Comm'n 1971).
98 E.g., Lake Hopatcong Water Corp., 85 P.U.R.3d 265, 273 (N.J. Bd. of Pub. Util. Comm'rs

1970).
99 E.g., Siren Tel. Co., Inc., 30 P.U.R.3d 336, 337 (Wis. Pub. Serv. Cornm'n 1959).
100 E.g., D.C. Transit Sys., Inc., 85 P.U.R.3d 508, 511-12 (D.C. Metropolitan Area Transit

Comm'n 1970).
101 See, e.g., Latourneau v. Citizens Util. Co., 125 Vt. 38, 209 A.2d 307 (1965).
102

E.g., D.C. Transit Systems, Inc., 85 P.U.R.3d 1, 13 (D.C. Metropolitan Area Transit

Comm'n 1970); Virginia City Water Co., 63 P.U.R.3d 464, 472 (Nev. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
1966).
E.g., Breaux Bridge Tel. Co., Inc., 25 P.U.R.3d 82, 85 (La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1958).
E.g., Henderson Tel. Co., Inc., 41 P.U.R.3d 248, 252 (Nev. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1961).
"05 See, e.g., Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. California Pub. Util. Comm'n, 62 Cal. 2d 634, 401
P.2d 353, 44 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1965); Mystic Isle Water Co., Inc., 76 P.U.R.3d 79 (N.J. Bd.
"'0

104

of Pub. Util. Comm'rs 1968).
1'E.g., Califorina Water Serv. Co., 46 P.U.R.3d 324, 325 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1962).
107

Cf. Askew v. Bevis, 37 Fla. 63, 283 So. 2d 337 (1973)
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paid to perform efficiently, and the cost thereof is included in allowable
operating expenses, the superior court ruled . . . that any allowance above
cost of capital must be supported by substantial evidence."1 8
The salary cases indicate no hesitancy to explore in detail the work
actually done by the individuals. One conclusion that may be drawn is that
it cannot be assumed that the commissions are poorly equipped to examine
the relationship between the work done and the payments made for the work.
By analogy, one could argue that but for the preemption doctrine in the
collective bargaining area, the commissions, practically speaking, have the
tools to decide whether the collective bargaining agreement represented an
appropriate settlement for the job to be done. A comparable result may be
approximated in some cases where the review of productivity and work-force
composition is sufficiently detailed.
C. Fringe Benefits
Where a collective bargaining contract exists, fringe benefits today
are almost as important a part of the contract as wages. It might be expected
that they would then be treated more like wages than salaries. That is to say,
it might be expected that commission review would be more general, and
less concerned with specific detail. Indeed, it might be questioned why they
would not come under the same review given productivity and other factors.
Whatever the reasons, the decisions appear to treat them in a distinct manner, with a detailed type of review. The reasons are not clear, in part because
the decisions are not numerous. One factor may be that the employer-paid
pension type of fringe benefit, one of the items receiving considerable
attention, is comparatively recent. In the context of employer-paid medical insurance, one commission generalized the matter in this fashion:
Fringe benefits, such as the ones noted above, are more and more an
integral part of union contracts, with the requirement that the employer
pay all the costs. These costs become part of the costs of doing business
and must be recovered by respondent." 9
The relatively recent origin may account for a greater degree of review than
is true of the more traditional wage factor.
In one decision a commission rejected any ratepayer expense associated
with a profit sharing plan, stating that it was not adaptable to a public utility
with a regulated rate of return.110 Expenses associated with the operation of
108 Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Equitable Gas Co., 61 P.U.R.3d 1, 25 (Pa. Pub.
Util. Comm'n 1965).

109 Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Bell Tel. Co., 2 P.U.R.4th 417, 437 (Pa. Pub. Util.

Comm'n 1973).
110 Wyoming Gas Co., 32 P.U.R.3d 60, 69 (Wvo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1959). But see United
Gas Corp. v. Mississippi Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 240 Miss. 405, 127 So. 2d 404 (1961), where 16
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an athletic field and association which at least some employees used was
rejected, in part, as being nonessential.111 The labor relations impact, if any,
was not mentioned. Recognizing the labor relations problem however, another
commission permitted reduced telephone rates for employees as a fringe
benefit. The commission equated rejection of the benefit with the commission
improperly deciding the number of paid holidays. 1 In other cases, utilities'
contributions to pension plans were reduced by one-third or one-half, in part
because they were overly generous."' Language cutting specific amounts of
the utilities' contribution or language phrased in terms of generosity is not
common in the wage area."' In another case, the special justification of meet1 15
ing "competition in the labor market for qualified engineers" was required.
Management's decisions on fringe benefits seem more subject to question than
in the wage area.
In some other respects, the treatment given fringe benefits is quite comparable to that covered in the discussion of wages and salaries. Where a
utility conditions the implementation of the plan on the commission's approval, the commission will not act in management's stead."' Where the
expense is still hypothetical, rather than actual, it will be disallowed."' A
pension plan patterned after others found in the industry is likely to meet
with approval."'
D. Summary
Despite the broad language of preemption, the commissions do look
in detail at many aspects of utility operating expenses which are also at the
heart of the utility's labor relations. Generalizations must be limited by the
fact that the commissions do not clearly distinguish collective bargaining
situations from non-collective bargaining situations. Fringe benefits and
an employee stock purchase plan was approved. A profit sharing plan was disallowed, but
only because it was not adequately explained, in Maxim Sewerage Corp., 98 P.U.R.3d 470
(N.J. Bd. of Pub. Util. Comm'rs 1973).
-11 Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 91 P.U.R.3d 321 (Pa. Pub.

Util. Comm'n 1971).
New York Tel. Co., 5 P.U.R.3d 33, 58 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1954).
Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 6 P.U.R.3d 428, 439 (Idaho Pub. Util. Comm'n 1954).
Norfolk & Carolina Tel. & Tel. Co., 8 P.U.R.3d 65, 67 (N.C. Util. Comm'n 1955). See also
Ely Light & Power Co., 39 P.U.R.3d 461 (Nev. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1961).
114 In one case, a pension fund for former employees was totally disallowed. Chesapeake
& Potomac Tel. Co., 57 P.U.R.3d 1 (D.C. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1964).
"L5Maxim Sewerage Corp., 98 P.U.R.3d 470, 473 (N.J. Bd. of Pub. Util. Comm'rs 1973).
116 Great Falls Gas Co., 11 P.U.R.3d 241 (Mont. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1955).
"1 E.g., New York State Elec. & Gas Co., 88 P.U.R.3d 300, 310 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
1971); Public Service Co., 33 P.U.R.3d 398, 409 (N.C. Util. Comm'n 1960); Burlington
Elec. Light Dep't, 95 P.U.R.3d 273, 275 (Vt. Pub. Serv. Bd. 1972).
"'sE.g., Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Commonwealth Tel. Co., 33 P.U.R.3d 503,
Published
by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1977
509 (Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1960).
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salaries are scrutinized in considerable detail, with specific allowances and
disallowances of expense, or even of programs, in some cases. Wages are
scrutinized in detail, but by using general criteria, such as productivity and
composition of the labor force. In all situations, speculative and hypothetical
expenses are disallowed. Expenses are also disallowed where the burden of
proof is not met, but the burden of proof is not always clearly established.
Disallowance of an expense must be understood as a disallowance in the rate
context, not as an order to deny a wage or salary payment, although in the
fringe benefit area, a few cases have gone beyond an evaluation of rates
and have questioned entire programs.
11. PERSONNEL AND WORKING CONDITIONS

Leaving consideration of primarily monetary questions, a second area
of commission impact on labor relations is its impact on personnel and working conditions. These discussions will be divided into three major topics: (A)
personnel, (B) equal employment opportunity, and (C) employee protective conditions. The point of focus remains on how the state utility regulation
relates to labor relations, keeping in mind the general preemption considerations stated by the United States Supreme Court.
A. Personnel
Commissions commonly have jurisdiction to require extension of utility
service or to approve or disapprove abandonment of service."' The required
extension of service or the approved abandonment of service will have an
obvious effect on labor relations, as more or less employees will be required
to meet the order. It is also arguable that such significant changes in the
operation may be outside of the area of mandatory topics of bargaining. 12 0
If these topics are outside of the requirement for good faith bargaining, they
would not be particularly relevant to issues at hand. Rather than attempt to
analyse this issue in depth, it seems more useful to move into more specific
areas of regulation, with the exception noted below.
The commissions normally have jurisdiction over service requirements
and safety considerations."2 It is primarily through these requirements that
the decisions of the commissions may have an influence on matters which are
also important in labor relations. In the particular context noted, one commission described the matter as follows:
This commission has no jurisdiction over purely labor disputes and
employee-management relations. . . . [I]n the area of railroad labor,
it would appear that Congress has preempted the field ....
This com119 PRIEsT, supra note 7,
120

at 234, 379.
See Moms, supra note 12, at 410-22.

121 See PRIEST, supra note 7, at 227-83.
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol10/iss2/2
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mission does have jurisdiction over issues pertaining to the safety of a
I'l
utility's plant and equipment ....
Deficiencies in service may require specific corrective action affecting
personnel or working conditions. The commission may order that personnel
be acquired to correct the deficiencies. Such an order would leave less room
for bargaining, and leave the utility in a difficult situation if impasse on
certain questions appeared likely. The commission might order the employ2 3 three additional
ment, for example, of a full-time service representative,
supervisory personnel,"' or a complaint hearings officer may be required
under commission rules.1"' In other situations, a general requirement to raise
service levels may be imposed. 2 In one case, the commission noted deficiencies in the number of transit bus drivers and in the force of traffic checkers.
No specific number of new personnel were ordered, but the commission said:
We have provided, in this order, sufficient funds to allow Transit to
solve the problems of personnel and equipment shortage, and having
provided the wherewithal, we expect to see the intended result."'
2
A contrary result was reached in a California decision. " The dilemma between commission action, on the one hand, and preemption and limited
commission jurisdiction on the other, is apparent in the conclusions of the
commission, which were as follows:
4. This commission does not have jurisdiction over labor-management
relations of Pacific which would include employment practices.
5. This commission does not have jurisdiction to require Pacific to hire
"bilingual personnel at all job levels."'2 9

Without resolving the conflict in the examples, it is sufficient to note that
other commissions have not found their jurisdiction to be so limited, although
they may not choose to exercise it in such a manner as to require the hiring
of new employees.
In addition to requiring new employees in some cases, commissions may
specifically approve the elimination of certain jobs. Where the safety and
welfare of the consumer were not adversely affected, commissions have approved the elimination of the position of an on-duty troubleman at certain
122

Chicago & North Western Ry. Co., 39 P.U.R.3d 206, 207 (111. Commerce Comm'n 1961).

Southwest Gas Corp., 69 P.U.R.3d 348, 357 (Nev. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1967).
Greyhound Lines, Inc., 61 P.U.R.3d 265, 285 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1965).
125 Michigan Gas Util. Co., 7 P.U.R.4th 356, 359 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1974).
123

124

126

E.g., Pacific Northwest Bell Tel. Co., 92 P.U.R.3d 433 (Ore. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1971).

D.C. Transit System Inc., 85 P.U.R.3d 1, 28 (D.C. Area Transit Comm'n 1970).
Mission Coalition Organization v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 94 P.U.R.3d 405 (Cal. Pub.
Comm'n 1972).
Util.
9
12 Id. at
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hours ' or the change in rank of the class of employee required to be in
charge of a railroad sleeping car.1 3' Commissions have also ordered review
of the cycle of trimming and line maintenance,1 3 alteration of the change in
taxi driver shift time,"' and review of engineering and maintenance of utility
properties.'
One commission notes that it "has never hesitated in the
acceptance of responsibility for employees' welfare and has granted relief
to employees of a public utility whose personal safety is jeopardized. . .. ""'
Safety in working conditions is a subject of bargaining, but with the passage
of the Occupational Safety and Health Act,' the area cannot claim to fall
under the scope of preemption.
When the quality of service or the immediate safety or welfare of the
consumer is at issue, the commissions do not usually feel restrained in making
general or specific recommendations or requirements on day-to-day operations. The effect, in part, of such orders is to determine at least some aspects
of the utility's labor relations and minimize some potential areas of bargaining.
B. Equal Employment Opportunity
The question of the jurisdiction of the commissions over the equal employment practices of the utilities is one of the most recent developments.
The statutes governing commission action are largely silent on the subject,
so that the power must be implied, if found at all.
The question may be raised in two ways. 3 ' One way is in the context
of a rate case; the other way is in the context of the commission's general
authority over service and other matters. In the context of a rate case, the
request may be made that an increase should not be granted if a utility is
found to be practicing employment discrimination. At least two decisions
indicate that rate context is an improper time to raise the issue.' Discrimina13 0Alton v. Union Elec. Co., 48 Il1. 436, 270 N.E.2d 9 (1971).
131 Pullman Co. v. South Carolina Pub. Serv. Cornm'n, 234 S.C. 365, 108
S.E.2d 571 (1961).
133E.g., Central Vt. Pub. Serv. Corp., 7 P.U.R.4th 67 (Vt. Pub. Serv. Bd. 1974).
133 E.g., Proposed Increased Rates for Taxicab Service in Baltimore City, 16 P.U.R.3d 406
(Md. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1956).
134Lee Tel. Co. v. Attorney General, 263 N.C. 702, 140 S.E.2d 319 (1970) (remand to
commission for review).
135 Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Bell Tel. Co., 43 P.U.R.3d 241, 242 (Pa. Pub. Util.
Comm'n
1962).
3
' See generally CCH GumEaooK TO OCCUPATIONAL
SAFETY AND HEALTH (1974).
137 It is possible to raise the issue in other
contexts which are relevant to present purposes.
One of the obvious times to raise the issue is when an applicant seeks original issuance
or
renewal of license. See, e.g., Stone v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 466 F.2d 316
(D.C. Cir. 1972).
13 8 NAACP v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 5 Pa. Commw. 312, 290 A.2d 704 (1972);
Application of Potomac Elec, Power Co., 83 P.U.R.3d 113 (D.C. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
1970).
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tory practices, however, may have some impact on a utility's rates. While
the main focus of this paper is on state commissions, a U. S. Supreme Court
139
decision involving the Federal Power Commission is instructive.
The NAACP had requested that the Federal Power Commission adopt
rules concerning employment discrimination practices and complaints. The
FPC refused, citing a lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court ruled that
the inclusion of the phrase "public interest" in the Commission's legislation
did not constitute a directive to eradicate discrimination in general. However,
the Supreme Court also ruled that the Commission should consider the effect
of discriminatory practices on the rate processes. The Court suggested the
following potential rate concerns:
(1) Duplicative labor costs incurred in the form of back pay recoveries
by employees who have proven that they were discriminatorily denied
employment or advancement, (2) the costs of losing valuable government contracts terminated because of employment discrimination, (3)
the costs of legal proceedings in either of these two categories, (4) the
costs of strikes, demonstrations, and boycotts aimed against regulatees
because of employment discrimination, (5) excessive labor costs incurred because of the elimination from the prospective labor force of
those who are discriminated against, and (6) the costs of inefficiency
among minority employees demoralized by discriminatory barriers to
their fair treatment or promotion.14 0
There were no dissents, but one of the two concurring opinions warned of
the speculative nature of items 4, 5 and 6 on the list.1 ' Items lacking a
proper evidentiary basis cannot be made the basis of a rate decision.
The decision has many interesting facets. As the concurring opinion
states, the majority makes at the least the initial assumption of a prima facie
case for Commission jurisdiction over the variety of expenses mentioned, such
as inefficiency or speculative loss of contract. Such detail in expense analysis
is not common in the decisions reviewed here, but it does suggest the scope
of the matters potentially covered by a logical extension of currently-accepted
expense analysis. Another intriguing facet is the manner in which the Court
resolves the issue. The technique is one commonly used in this area, but one
which is incapable of precise application and limitation on Commission
authority. The Court said that the Commission
is authorized to consider the consequences of discriminatory employment practices on the part of its regulatees only insofar as such conseNAACP v. Federal Power Comm'n, 96 S. Ct. 1806 (1976).
140 Id. at 1810.
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establishment of just and reason-

This gives the Commission potentially broad authority, as many other cases
suggest in this paper. When an employment practice has a rate impact, the
Commission can control its effect on the rate processes. The potentially broad
approach makes the distinction between wages and salaries in the cases
mentioned above even more tenuous. The third facet of the case is primarily
one of caution. While the Court speaks as though rates were the key point
throughout most of the opinion, it also states "in the case of the Power and
Gas Acts, it is clear that the principal purpose . . .was to encourage the
orderly development of plentiful supplies of electricity and natural gas at
reasonable prices."'' The Commission would thus have more than rates as a
basis upon which to promulgate rules concerning employment discrimination. State legislation usually covers quality of service, so it is arguable, by
analogy, that state commissions would have yet another basis for rules on
employment discrimination.
Two state decisions have rejected the claim that they have jurisdiction
over such employment practices, while the District of Columbia has found
such jurisdiction. One state rejected jurisdiction on the grounds, in part,
that the commission is not enforcing general concepts of the public interest
and that jurisdiction was placed by the legislature in the human relations
agency.' Another rejected jurisdiction, in part, because other agencies had
been granted such jurisdiction and because no effect on operating efficiencies
was demonstrated in the evidence.' 5 The District of Columbia Commission
accepted jurisdiction, in part because of their statutory authority to promote
the public interest. As part of the remedy, an affirmative action plan was
devised to be administered by the commission.'
The issue is an intriguing one, for if a commission is found to have
jurisdiction, the impact on labor relations could be quite large in some situations. Among the issues which are related would be promotion, discharge and
discipline, seniority systems, and, of course, wages. With the passage of the
1964 Civil Rights legislation, the matter is clearly not preempted by the
NLRA.' States were authorized to create their own agencies. With the preemption question removed, the issue must turn on the particular organic
142 d.
143 Id. at 1811 (Emphasis added.)

NAACP v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 5 Pa. Commw. 312, 290 A.2d 704 (1972).
45Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 87 P.U.R.3d 270 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1971).
'46Potomac Elec. Power Co., 83 P.U.R.3d 113, 147 (D.C. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1970); peti'44

tion for reconsideration, 84 P.U.R.3d 236, 246 (D.C. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1970).

Vee 42 U.S.C. §§2000e-2000e(15) (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. 2000e(16)(17) (1973). 22
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legislation of the agency. To the extent that operating expenses or service
efficiences of the type already mentioned here could be demonstrated, it
would be difficult to find that the commissions do not have at least some
jurisdiction. The difficulty of meeting whatever burden of proof was mandated
might mean that the jurisdiction was one that was only occasionally exercised.
However, jurisdiction over rates, with the resultant investigations that are
made, is not a very narrow jurisdiction.
The problem here is one that is common to most of the questions considered. If one can demonstrate a rate or service impact, then it should be
presumed that the commission has that particular jurisdiction. Normally, the
showing of a rate or service impact may not go to the heart of all of the other
issues sought to be raised. For example, showing the wage impact on operating expenses allows the commission to rule on the expense issue, but not on the
contract that created the wages. The converse may also be true. If one can
show a rate or service impact, the commission may be the only agency with
jurisdiction on that issue since the legislature presumably gave the commission exclusive jurisdiction. On matters such as discrimination, in the
absence of general statutory authorization, the commissions may not be able
to promote a general public interest, but only that specific public interest
which gave rise to their original creation.
C. Employee Protective Clauses
The final topic in this section concerns the state cases involving protections given employees in the event of mergers or divestiture. At the federal
level, special clauses ordered by the commissions or courts are common,
under Interstate Commerce Commission legislation, for example.14 The
California commission cases appear to be the leading ones at the state level.
In those cases, the commission has conditioned permission to abandon a
service on the requirement that adversely affected employees would receive
employment protection and benefits, and has approved specific clauses to
that effect. The commission sought to distinguish the requirement from any
concern with wage negotiations or conflict with the NLRA 4 The purported
distinctions are not altogether clear. The cases are important, despite their
uniqueness, to demonstrate the potential scope of jurisdiction that can be
arguably distinguished from the preempted areas covered by the NLRA.
Abandonments go to the service questions, and the effect, absent a protective
clause, may be to threaten other utility services. The commission may exercise
jurisdiction to approve or disapprove a particular clause.
1148See, e.g., Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. Nemitz, 404 U.S. 37 (1971); United States v.
El Paso Natural Gas Co., 358 F. Supp. 820 (D. Colo. 1972).
149Metropolitan Coach Lines, 21 P.U.R.3d 368, 372 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1957); Key
Sys. Transit Lines, 17 P.U.R.3d 505 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1957); Richmond & San
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D. Summary
The cases in this section emphasize the important areas of non-monetary
commission jurisdiction. The commissions can deal with discharges and new
hires, and approve or disapprove certain job responsibilities and other working
conditions. The subjects of these decisions relate directly to important aspects
of the utility's labor relations. Employment discrimination questions have
recently been raised. At least a partial resolution of the question of jurisdiction could be resolved by relating sufficient evidence of discrimination to
either operating expenses or to its impact on service efficiencies. Employee
protective clauses are a limited example of yet another area of possible jurisdiction that relates directly to labor relations. The rate cases emphasize the
most prominent activities of the commission which cannot be completely
divorced from an impact on labor relations. Review of the service related
cases provides another vivid example that labor relations cannot remain
totally encapsulated in the preemption box when the impact of a decision
may affect the commission's primary obligations.
IV.

NEGOTIATIONS AND IMPASSE

The third major section of discussion covers those commission decisions
which relate directly to collective bargaining negotiations and impasse. Many
of the decisions in this section obviously relate to cases in the preceding sections. They are specifically collected in this section because they are distinguished by the fact that the commission must acknowledge the particular
labor relations context in which the issues are raised. For example, the commission may be faced with a strike. The decisions in this section will be
divided into two major categories: (A) collective bargaining and impasse,
and (B) adjustment clauses.
A. Bargaining and Impasse
The cases in this section are distinguished by proximity to, and discussion
of, specific aspects of collective bargaining. While the preceding decisions
may have an indirect impact on these aspects of labor relations, the cases
here talk directly about the issues. The NLRA may preempt the area, but
it does not mean that the commissions can ignore the problems.
Preliminarily, it is worth noting that the impact of collective bargaining
contracts reaches beyond the persons covered by the agreements. A common
practice is for a utility to grant its non-union employees a wage increase
comparable to that given union employees, and commissions seem to approve
of the practice. 5 ' The pattern setting nature of the union contract is not
150E.g.,

San Diego Transit Sys., 57 P.U.R.3d 515, 520 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n (1964);

Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Duquesne Light Co., 88 P.U.R.3d 1, 30 (Pa. Pub. Util.
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol10/iss2/2
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uncommon, and it is certainly a practical response on the part of the utility
management. The rarely questioned passthrough does, however, raise questions concerning the productivity and composition of the non-union workforce which may go unanswered by the uncritical acceptance of this practice.
Attention has already been directed to the problems of commissions
when hypothetical or speculative operating expense figures are proposed.
Bargaining prior to settlement is one context in which that type of case
may easily arise. The commissions will not approve an estimated settlement
to a contract that is yet to be resolved.' Even where the estimate is based
upon the experience of the percent of settlement in prior years, it may be
too speculative. 5 In addition to the speculation question, the commission
may not want to prejudice a future wage settlement prior to negotiations
by stating a figure.' 5 3 One commission stated the matter in this fashion:
[T]o permit an offset of (yet to be negotiated) wages would be in effect
to give a blank check to Edison and its employees' union, signed by
the commission, to be filled out in any amount that Edison and the
unions agree upon. We do... concur in the staff's concern that an
allowance for increased wages for rate-making purposes not be inter5
preted as a "floor" from which negotiations might commence. '
When an offer has been made to a union and the offer is communicated
to the commission, the fact that the offer was later rejected and a higher
offer was accepted does not apparently prejudice the matter before the
commission."' Additional explanation of why the higher operating expense
was needed, that is, why the union rejected the earlier offer, is apparently
not commonly required. The commission will not find a lack of good faith
5
merely because the utility did not go to impasse and strike." Indeed,
rejection by the union of a lower offer may be used to show the propriety
of the utility's wage expense in some cases. 5 7 An obvious bargaining strategy
is suggested. Settlement of negotiations during the rate hearing is a common
example of an allowed, out-of-test-year adjustment to expenses.158
In a few circumstances, a figure will be accepted which does not
E.g., Potomac Elec. Power Co., 95 P.U.R.3d 99, 107 (D.C. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1972).
Gas Co., 88 P.U.R.3d 181, 187 (Conn. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1971).
153 E.g., A-J Industries, Inc., 78 P.U.R.3d 421, 424 (Alas. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1969).
'54 Southern Cal. Edison Co., 90 P.U.R.3d 1, 16 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1971).
'55 E.g., Brooklyn Union Gas Co. 100 P.U.R.3d 345 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1973);
General Tel. Co. v. Tennessee Pub. Serv. Comm'n 7 P.U.R.4th 273 (Tenn. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1974).
156 E.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 87 P.U.R.3d 270, 290 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1971).
157 E.g., Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 100 P.U.R.3d 345, 355 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1973).
158 E.g., Pennzoil Co., 6 P.U.R.4th 189 (W.Va. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1974); Columbia Gas,
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constitute the final settlement figure. An example of such a circumstance
is where several unions are involved, and some of them have settled. For
example, a provable pattern may have been established that where settlement with, for example, the driver employees has shaped the settlement with
the mechanics, a proposed figure for the mechanics may be allowed after the
drivers have finally settled.1 ' Similarly, where a settlement with six unions
has occurred, it may be clear that the yet to be reached settlement with the
seventh union will be at no less a figure than with the first six."' 0
The crunch-point in collective bargaining is the strike resulting from
impasse, a matter clearly within the NLRA preemption, but equally within
the commission's concerns over service. The problem is well-stated by one
federal court:
The parties to a labor dispute have right, indeed a duty, to engage
in collective bargaining under the federal statutes.... Essential to the
right to free and unfettered collective bargaining in this case is an
injunction against further proceedings before the Delaware Public
Service Commission.
The threatened interference with collective bargaining must be enjoined to preserve the integrity of the federal statutory scheme for the
resolution of labor disputes. Informed citizens may well decry this
result which leaves municipalities at the mercy of industrial strife.
But, that is a necessary consequence of a legislative enactment which
contains provisions for a cooling-off period in the case of a national
emergency but contains no similar remedy for a local emergency. 1 '
Commissions' responses to the strike or its threat have been varied, and have
met with mixed success in the federal courts. One response has been to
investigate or monitor the bargaining. A commission has conducted an
inquiry into the good faith of the utility in its bargaining. The allegation
was made that the transit company was not interested in settling the labor
dispute, but was using the impasse as a means of prompting the purchase
of the utility by the city. 6 ' Clearly, a service related issue was raised. In a
related matter, a federal court enjoined the specific action proposed by
the commission, but stated: "Undeniably, the commission should be kept informed of the progress of the negotiations; similarly the commission should be
told if collective bargaining ceases."' 63 Investigations by other types of panels
San Diego Transit Sys., 51 P.U.R.3d 396 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1963).
1 New York Tel. Co., 92 P.U.R.3d 321 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1971).
159
60

161 Delaware Coach Co. v. Delaware Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 265 F. Supp. 648, 654 (D. Del.

1967).
6
Wilmington v. Delaware Coach Co., 67 P.U.R.3d 412, 415 (Del. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1967).
263 Delaware Coach Co. v. Delaware Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 265 F. Supp. 648, 651
(D. Del.
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of impasse situations have been frowned upon by some federal courts.
Where the investigation and report is aimed at bringing public opinion to
bear to force settlement, such action was found to be coercive and interference was prohibited.' In another case, the court decided that a factfinding panel would be tantamount to requiring settlement on the basis
of the findings, except to the extent that public pressure could not be resisted.
A public utility could not resist.'65 Another court stated "mere" participation
in the investigation would have a tendency to solidify positions making ultimate decisions more difficult, and hence it would be coercive. 6
Other techniques have been tried, some of which involve the certification given to a public utility. A federal case involving the Interstate
Commerce Commission is instructive. A trucker could no longer perform
because of a union boycott, and the shippers sought to get certification
of a new company to replace the struck company. The United States
largely because
Supreme Court struck down the additional certification,'
of a lack of findings and analysis to justify the choice of remedy of certification over the alternative remedy of a cease and desist order. However, the
Court noted:
We do not imply that service deficiencies of the kind found in this
record could never justify the issuance of permanent operating authority. A totally different case might be presented if other remedial action
by the commission and the board proved fruitless, hopelessly timeconsuming, or otherwise inadequate to terminate the interruptions
in service. Nor do we intend to pass upon the commission's discretion
under Section 210a to provide temporary authority, pending determination of an application for authority or cease and desist order, or
as an alternative to permanent authority to remedy service deficiencies
of the kind present here. 68
The Court noted also that the Commission should be particularly careful
in its choice of remedy "because of the possible effects of its decisions on
the functioning of the national labor policy."' 69 When a state commission
sought to review the certification of a struck utility, a federal court enjoined
the review."' One commission denied it had legislative authority to approve
164

Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Workers, Local 5-283 v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co., 332

F.2d 64 (10th Cir. 1964).
165

Grand Rapids City Coach Line v. Howlett, 137 F. Supp. 667, 673 (W.D. Mich. 1955).

166

General Elec. Co. v. Callahan, 294 F.2d 60, 67 (5th Cir. 1961).

Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156 (1962).
168 Id. at 171 n. 20.
167

269

Id. at 172.
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additional certification in this context, because of the impact on collective
17 1
bargaining.
One commission went to the heart of its dispute and actively worked
with both union and utility to help resolve it, and then ordered the remedy.
The problem involved the bus drivers' refusal to drive with money for
change at night for fear of being robbed, and the utility refusal to let them
go without change. The interim solution was to use scrip instead of money.'
The order of the commission ran to the use of scrip, but it did not contain
an order to the drivers to resume work, in part, perhaps because the commission does not have clear jurisdiction directly over employees per se."'
The commission grounded its jurisdiction partly on the problem of fare
or revenue collection, relating to rates, and the robbery problem, relating
to safety.
Some suggested solutions to impasse have been rejected by the commissions. One case considered a range of possibilities. It was suggested
that a court appoint a receiver for a struck utility, but the commission
stated it would not recognize such an appointment.'
In the same case,
where it was suggested that the commission agree to underwrite a rate
increase so as to allow easier agreement on wages, the commission also
refused. Finally, that commission also denied authority to order the utility
to submit to arbitration or to perform any act which would involve or
invite strikebreakers.
An aspect of the strike question concerns the duty of the utility to
perform services despite the labor dispute. The position of a utility in a
strike situation is not the same as the position of an unregulated private
company which can abandon business at will. Permission to abandon is
required, but a struck utility need not seek a temporary suspension of its
certificate prior to its cessation of service because of a strike. Such a
requirement would result in additional lost time and service while the
temporary order was being vacated.'
The utility is required to render
service so long as it is reasonably able to, and cannot voluntarily and
Silver State Cab Co., 40 P.U.R.3d 103, 105 (Nev. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1961).
D.C. Transit Sys. Inc., 74 P.U.R.3d 32 (D.C. Area Transit Comm'n 1968).
173 See Wilmington v. Delaware Coach Co., 67 P.U.R.3d 412, 416 (Del. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
1967), where the commission stated:
We realize that our decision to inquire into the good faith of Delaware Coach (in bargaining) presents a piecemeal approach since we have no authority to inquire into the
conduct of the other party to the labor dispute.
174 Oakland v. Keys Sys. Transit Lines, 1 P.U.R.3d 150, 158-59 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n
1953).
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol10/iss2/2
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unilaterally cease service. 7 0 A strike is not considered to be a voluntary
suspension, particularly where the utility has taken all reasonable and
lawful means to resume service,"' where the utility has acted in good
faith,' 7 8 or where the termination of services results from risk of injury
or harm to the employees who would be willing to work.' The good faith
prerequisite, however, does not seem to be one that is commonly investigated.
At least in theory, the utility can be ordered to resume services despite
In the federal context, a utility's right to resort to
the strike situation.'
self-help to continue services despite a strike was described by the United
States Supreme Court in this manner:
While a carrier has the duty to make all reasonable efforts to continue
its operations during a strike, its power to make new terms and conditions governing the new labor force is strictly confined, if the spirit
of the Railway Labor Act is to be honored. The Court of Appeals used
the words "reasonably necessary." We do not disagree, provided that
"reasonably necessary" is construed strictly. The carrier must respect
the continuing status of the collective agreement and make only such
changes as are truly necessary in light of the inexperience and lack
of training of the new labor force of the lesser number of employees
available for the continued operation. The collective bargaining agreement remains the norm; the burden is on the carrier to show the
need for any alteration of it, as respects the new and different class
of employees that it is required to employ in order to maintain that
continuity of operation that the law requires of it.'"
The case can be read, in part, as authorizing the use of what unions
would call "strikebreakers." Assuming the state level commissions have
comparable authority and responsibility, the inroads on the preemption
doctrine are abvious.
Another aspect of the strike situation is the commissions' treatment,
for rate purposes, of the various costs involved in the labor dispute. If the
utility is allowed to recover, it should be done, as one federal court said,
without favoring one side or the other in the labor controversy,' 8 2 although
17 E.g., Wilmington v. Delaware Coach Co., 67 P.U.R.3d 412

(Del. Pub. Serv. Comm'n

1967).
E.g., Oakland v. Key Sys. Transit Lines, 1 P.U.R.3d 150 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1953).
E.g., Furniture Mfrs. Ass'n v. Turner, 38 P.U.R.3d 500 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1961).
179 Meier & Pohlman Furniture Co. v. Gibbons, 223 F.2d 296 (8th Cir. 1956).
180 E.g., Oakland v. Key Sys. Transit Lines, 1 P.U.R.3d 150, 156 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n
1953); Wilmington v. Delaware Coach Co., 67 P.U.R.3d 412, 415 (Del. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
1967).
18, Brotherhood of Ry. and S.S. Clerks v. Florida East Coast Ry. Co., 384 U.S. 238, 247-48
177

178

(1966).
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the statement seems to be more hopeful than practical.'8 3 The federal court
did illustrate the problem. If the utility suffers a loss in revenue due to the
strike, it may not be able to render its statutorily-required service unless
the loss is made up by the rate payers. However, not all losses will be of
that magnitude and perhaps they should not be recoverable.' If the strike
"would not have occurred under honest, economical, and efficient
management," perhaps recovery should be denied. 8 One state court remanded
a question of whether maintenance which was normally done in an earlier
year, but which was neglected because of a strike, could be included in
the subsequent test year expenses. 8 ' Recovery of strike costs is not a
developed doctrine.
Several attempts have been made to persuade a commission to include
an allowance for future expenses arising from prospective labor problems.
The attempts commonly cite the cyclical nature of the utility's labor problems and their apparent desire to be prepared for any recurrence. Such
requests may be rejected because of the speculative nature of the request 8
or because of the unreliability of evidence that an actual cycle is at work. 8
The dilemma involved appears to be obvious. If future strike expenses are
allowable, the utility may have little to lose by being adamant; if the costs
are not reimbursable, the utility may have to accept union demands or the
public will lose a vital service. The lack of cases and discussion does not
reflect the significance of the issues involved.
A different aspect of the strike situation is the subsequent effects of
the strike on the quality of service even after the strike has been resolved.
One commission ordered a utility to resume full service, the strike having
been over for 10 months, though the utility blamed the strike for the poor
service. 9 A similar order in another case arising six months after the strike
was reversed for want of evidence is in the record. 190
It is clear that, preemption notwithstanding, the commissions cannot
simply ignore the collective bargaining and impasse issues. The responses
See, e.g., Almacs v. Hackett, 312 F. Supp. 964 (D.R.I. 1970) See generally A. THIEBLOT &
R. COWIN, WELFARE AND STRiKEs, THE USE OF PUBLIC FUNDS TO SUPPORT STRIKERS (1972).
184 American Overseas Airlines v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 254 F.2d 744, 750
(D.C. Cir. 1958).
185 Id.
See also Capital Transit Co., 9 P.U.R.3d 449, 459 (D.C. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1955)
(Weston, Comm'r, concurring).
186 New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Massachusetts Dep't of Pub. Util.,
360 Mass. 443, 275
N.E.2d 493 (1971).
187 E.g., American Overseas Airlines v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 254 F.2d 744
(D.C. Cir. 1958);
Consumers' Gas Co., 7 P.U.R.4th 321 (Ontario Energy Bd. 1974).
188 E.g., Airfield Service Co., 46 P.U.R.3d 246 (Conn. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1962).
189New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 81 P.U.R.3d 171 (Mass. Dep't of Pub. Util. 1969).
190 Florida East Coast Ry. Co. v. Mason, 177 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 1965). See also New York
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol10/iss2/2
Tel. Co., 92 P.U.R.3d 321, 354 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1971).
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to the problems are varied and not particularly conclusive. Analogous
federal cases exist in some areas, but they do not appear to have had a great
deal of effect on the actions of the commissions. The commissions appear,
in many cases, to act more on their conceptions of the proper policy than
on federal mandates. The problem is obviously unresolved. The risks of
allowing commission action in this area are several. One author notes that
"it is often feared that a change.. . extending greater authority to state
governments to deal with local disputes would result in widespread abuse.","1
In a different, but related context, former Justice Douglas described the
potential problems if commissions were empowered to approve or disapprove
bargaining agreements. His conclusion, in part, was: "Meanwhile years
might pass as the contest wound its way slowly through various tribunals
and the labor problems continued to fester. ' 192 A want of better policy,
however, leads to the type of ad hoc decisions illustrated above.
B. Adjustment Clauses
Related to some aspects of the collective bargaining situation is the
question of the automatic adjustment clause for wages. Under such a clause,
wage changes would be passed on the ratepayers directly without the
intervening rate hearing. A fuel adjustment clause is commonly used today,
primarily to pass on the increased cost of oil which is subject to great price
fluctuation.19 It will be recalled that a number of commissions have refused
to guarantee to pass on a rate increase during bargaining 9 or refused to
approve contingent wage increases.9
There appears to be little question but that such a clause for wages is
permissible. The question appears to go primarily to the wisdom of granting
such permission. New Jersey adopted an adjustment clause which includes
wages."9 The primary concern appeared to be in the adequacy of the
monitoring devices used in the administration and review of the clause."'
Several other commission decisions of varying age have rejected the use of
a wage adjustment clause. The grounds for refusal included reduced management incentives for efficient operations, 98 inability to offset other financial
191 B. TAYLOR & F. WHITNEY, LABOR RELATIONS LAW 496 (2d ed. 1975).

Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 390 U.S. 261, 312
(1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
193 See generally Arnold, Reining in Utilities, Power Companies Face Curb on Fast Recovery
of Fuel Cost Increases,Wall Street Journal, Jan. 13, 1976, at 1, col. 6.
294 See notes 151-154 and accompanying text supra.
195 See cases cited note 80 supra.
192

196 Rate Counsel v. New Jersey Bell Tel. Co., 66 N.J. 476, 333 A.2d 4 (1975); Re Adjustment Clause in Tel. Rate Schedules, 3 P.U.R.4th 298 (N.J. Bd. of Pub. Util. Comm'rs 1973).
197 For the various requirements in an FPC approved fuel adjustment clause, see Part 35,

Filing of Rate Schedules, CCH UTIL. L.
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FED. §35.14, para. 3644 (1975).
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entries,1 99 or a history indicating the ability to absorb labor costs. 00 The labor
.relations impact of such a clause apparently has not been a major factor.
While the adoption of such a clause would have a direct impact on labor
relations, it would arguably not fall within the prohibited area of preemption
because the approval is for rate purposes, and does not represent direct
approval of the contract per se. In light of some of the decisions covered
in the preceding section on collective bargaining, the adoption of a wage
adjustment clause would represent the rejection of a moderately large
amount of policy precedent. Unions and utilities might relish the thought
of bargaining in an automatic adjustment clause environment.
C. Summary
When collective bargaining and impasse issues are directly faced by
commissions, the reported decisions seem to emphasize practical necessity
over procedural theorizing. The commissions seem reluctant to attempt to
force a settlement or an end to impasse in most cases, but leverage, largely
unused, appears to exist. Competing certifications and monitoring of bargaining progress appear to be possible areas of activity, although the decisions in the latter area are mixed. On. the other hand, the wholesale
adoption of an automatic wage adjustment clause, unless very specific
protections are included, would appear to forfeit much of the ability
of the commissions to review this area. The adjustment clause raises its
own problems. While automatic approval for rate purposes might not infringe too deeply into national labor policies, it is arguable that retroactive rejection, at the time of review of clause operations, of some aspects
of wages already paid, might cause sufficient uncertainty to upset the
application of the national labor policy. Utility recovery of strike expenses, where permitted, might easily have an unbalancing effect, particularly
in light of the recent concern expressed over strikers receiving governmental benefits. Considerably more commission inquiry, in appropriate
cases, into the bargaining process seems warranted and reasonable, although
the state commission could do little about the contract negotiated at the
national level. A number of the matters that are important at the bargaining table are equally important and appropriate in the administration of
the rate and service function. Among these are questions of productivity,
good faith efforts to reach agreement so services continue, managerial efficiency, and commission avoidance of rubber stamping agreements by design
or necessity. The commission can conduct an inquiry subsequent to the
199 Connecticut and Pennsylvania appear to have rejected present use of the clause. See United
Illuminating Co., 42 P.U.R.3d 187 (Conn. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1961); Pennsylvania Pub.
Util. Comm'n v. Bell Tel. Co., 2 P.U.R.4th 417 (Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1973).
200 Kentucky Util. Co., 22 P.U.R.3d 113, 121 (Ky. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1958). It is noted
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol10/iss2/2
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bargaining, and nothing but commission choice appears to prohibit the
commission from giving its prior approval to a wage expense. Inquiry at
the time of bargaining does not seem inconsistent with this policy.
V. DISCUSSION
A major question in this area is obviously the scope of federal preemption. With utility rates rising rapidly, and the most immediate consumer
pressures being felt by state commissions, the commissions may be impelled
to view all operating costs and service requirements more carefully, including
those affecting labor relations. One restriction in this area is the preemption
doctrine. A recent federal case suggests the near ultimate in the exercise of
the preemption doctrine. In that case, the Federal Power Commission was
permitted to sue to enjoin the operation of the rules of a state commission
2
which were in violation of the Federal National Gas Act. "' One marvels
at the prospect of a harried state commission attempting to defend against
a suit brought by the National Labor Relations Board!
The difficulties and frustrations faced by the state commissions were
poignantly expressed by the Oregon commissioner when he stated:
Before indicating the selection of an alternative, it should be observed
that wage negotiations between utilities and labor unions take place
in an atmosphere of mutual recognition that all of the increased wages
will be passed back directly to the consumers in the form of increased
rates. Indeed, it is doubtful that the consumer, as the real party in
interest, is ever independently represented at the bargaining table
whenever regulated industries are involved. The time may fast be
approaching when regulatory agencies such as the Federal Communications Commission or the various state regulatory commissions or
any organization such as the National Association of Regulatory Utility
Commissioners should sit in as a formal participant in wage negotiations
involving the entire regulated telephone industry, such as is realistically
the case whenever the Bell System and the Communications Workers
of America renew contract discussions. In any event, the record is
devoid of evidence that the Oregon consumer, at least, was effectively
represented in the settlement before us .... 02
One way around the preemption doctrine is clear, but has highly charged
political overtones. Without attempting to revive battles long since fought
and still smoldering in the utility field, it is clear that the NLRA does
not cover publicly-owned utilities."0 3 Public ownership is not entirely free
from federal concern, however, as federal law determines whether an entity
201

Corporation Comm'n v. FPC, 415 U.S. 961 (1974)
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202 Pacific Northwest Bell Tel. Co., 92 P.U.R.3d 433, 450 (Ore. Pub. Util. ComM'n 1971).
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qualifies as a "political subdivision" not subject to the NLRA. °' In addition,
a new preemption might arise if federal legislation governing labor relations
in the public sector is passed." 5 The cases reviewed here do not indicate any
different treatment for publicly-owned utilities which come under commission
jurisdiction. It seems clear, however, that if the state so desired, it could
enact legislation treating those publicly-owned utilities differently for these
purposes. At present, however, there does not seem to be a practical
difference.
Another obvious solution to the dilemma would be the passage of
appropriate federal legislation to clarify the role of states' jurisdiction over
the labor relations of public utilities and then for the states to express
their own legislative policies. A part of the legislation that would be useful
might be to authorize the commissions to explicitly recognize a role for
the unions when dealing with these questions. °6 Unions would be able
to provide information on a number of important issues, such as productivity.
Particularly when dealing with safety and other matters relating to working
conditions, and when impasse is near, the union's presence would seem to
be essential to a satisfactory solution. When the commission orders can run
only to one party in the dispute, the commission can be limited to a less
constructive role. It is apparent that the unions are directly affected by
many matters which fall within commission jurisdiction. As heretical as
it may seem in some quarters, perhaps the unions ought to be directly
involved, if they are going to be directly affected.
Commission actions may affect different types of utilities in different
ways. For example, monitoring of quality of service, with the resultant impact
on personnel and working conditions, may be more important where the
utility receives a high portion of its income from fixed minimum charges,
such as in telephones. 0 7 Personnel disputes may have a more immediate
impact in transit operations than in some utilities. Where there is the
possibility of immediate substitutions for utility services with the concomitant total loss of revenue, labor problems may take on a greater
immediacy. The point is that greater study of the problems of particular
classes of utilities may result in identifying the most significant problems
faced by that utility and hence by the commissions. Based on this type of
information, it may be possible through legislation to give the commissions
204

NLRB v. Natural Gas Util. Dist., 402 U.S. 600, 602-04 (1971).

See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 12532, H.R. 7684, H.R. 9324, Before the Special Subcomm.
on Labor of the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 92d Cong. 2d Sess. (1972). But see
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National League of Cities v. Usery, 96 S. Ct. 2465 (1976).
E.g., D.C. Transit Sys., Inc., 73 P.U.R.3d 268 (D.C. Area Transit Comm'n 1968) (union
made party to proceeding).
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the most immediately-needed type of clear authorization even though it is
felt that, in general, commission authority ought to remain limited in other
areas, or that the preemption doctrine ought not to be basically altered.
The preemption issue is being indirectly affected in a piecemeal fashion.
Legislation such as the Civil Rights Act and the Occupational Safety and
Health Act have taken mandatory subjects of bargaining out of the exclusive
realm of collective bargaining. Federal and state agencies now share in
the resolution of these issues. If the state commissions need further authority
to act in these areas, the problem appears to lie mainly with the state
legislatures. New types of energy, communications, or transportation legislation could be drafted to similar effect. Careful study of some of the new
legislation may show that the area of preemption has already been narrowed
in areas outside of these obvious ones.
By analogy, the U. S. Supreme Court decision in NAACP v. Federal
Power Commission, discussed above,"°8 appears to cast light on the preemption issue. The case would seem to indicate that so long as a state
commission casts its employment practices actions in terms of the impact
on rates or service, not subjects of preemption, it should be able to avoid
the preemption trap. Without deciding the matter clearly, the Court did
indicate that the scope of subjects which affect rates is extremely broad.
There would seem to be many avenues by which to avoid preemption
limitations.
The commissions currently employ a number of useful tools in their
analysis. Paramount among these are productivity, general rejection of
speculative or hypothetical expenses, analysis of the composition of the
workforce, the test year balance of revenue and expenses, and specific
review of matters such as overtime. The specific review of salary against job
is particularly intriguing, but the failure of the decisions to define the parameters of the term salary, as contrasted with wages, reduce its overall importance. To the extent that these analytical tools are not institutionalized through
rulemaking, their usefulness in a given case will be diminished. As suggested
above, institutionalizing a role for unions could be particularly useful. One
area needing particular attention, at least in the decisions, is a clear placing
of the burden of proof.
Among the various expenses, salaries receive the most detailed attention,
and wages receive less. Assuming away all definitional problems, the
difference may lie in the preemption doctrine. What is unexplained, however,
is the common pass-through of nonunion wages which may be accompanyPublished
IdeaExchange@UAkron,
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ing a claim for union wage expense. They would seem to require the
same productivity, workforce, and other analysis, but the decisions do not
reflect this. While the number of decisions raises questions itself, what
decisions are available suggest that fringe benefits receive closer scrutiny
than wages. Scrutiny in those instances appears to go as far as the desirability
or wisdom of the benefit. The reason for the distinction, to the extent it
exists, is unclear. If an athletic association is not needed, perhaps an extra
two cents per hour is also unnecessary.
Adoption of an automatic wage adjustment clause would seem to
frustrate much of what the commissions presently do. As the many cases
suggest, utilities and unions often want commission approval of increases
before they make them effective, and the commissions generally refuse. The
adjustment clause would appear to be one way around the major impact
of the past refusals. The apparent desirability to the parties of this type
of commission action suggests its importance in collective bargaining.
If it is all that important, it would require scrutiny under the preemption
doctrine. Where a wage adjustment clause is adopted, very careful monitoring
and review devices would be needed. Once again, input by unions would
appear even more essential. Commission legislative authority and choice
seem to be more important than the preemption doctrine.
A major question requiring more explanation is the propriety of commission monitoring of the bargaining process for rate purposes. The commissions seem, at this point, to have the following general authority: to
require a struck utility to render service in some circumstances, to impliedly
authorize the use of strikebreakers, to order filling of specific jobs, to
reject specific fringe benefits, to give approval to a yet undetermined wage
increase by means of an automatic adjustment clause, and to reject for
rate purposes a known wage increase. In the light of this range of authority,
subject to exercise both prior to and after bargaining, it would seem that
the exercise of monitoring authority for rate purposes during bargaining
would be useful. One problem is, however, that the unions have no direct
responsibilities to the commission, limiting the effects of a commission order.
Utility rates are rapidly increasing and, in many respects, the increases
appear to be inevitable. The utilities and commissions are subject to forces
not of their making. As control over these forces diminishes, it seems
inevitable that increased attention will be given to service questions, as
contrasted with expense questions. The cases reviewed here do not reveal
doctrines for the review of services in the labor relations context as well
developed as those used in review of labor expenses. The authority of the
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol10/iss2/2
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is no clear test to measure the level of service, nor any consistent effort
made to conduct the review. Service is in a large measure a function of
machines, labor, and organization. Labor relations is the subject here.
Consistent and systematic review of service would have a great impact on
labor relations. Expansion of the use of the productivity measure already
suggests possibilities, including efficiency, which could include review
of quality of the job done, training, the balance of workforce skills, and wagebenefits attraction of the necessary skilled employees. As the decisions
indicate, commissions have already approached these topics, although not in
a systematic and direct fashion. Commission decisions on the propriety of
an overtime expense or on the specification of a position that must be
filled are indicative of the types of issues which can only be expected to
increase. An increased concern with service questions might put the currently broad review of wages on a par with the more intensive exercise of
review of salaries and, in the few cases, fringe benefits.
CONCLUSION

The state public utility commissions operate within the limitations
of their own statute and the preemption doctrine. Their statutory authority
does not generally extend specifically to labor relations, and their actions
must conform to the bounds of the federal national labor policy. In their
exercise of authority over rates and service, the commissions may have a
significant impact on labor relations. Wages, salaries, and fringe benefits
are subject to varying degrees of review for the purpose of establishing
rates. As operating expenses, they may be allowed or disallowed for rate
purposes. Review of service may lead commission orders affecting personnel
and working conditions. Enforcement of the statutory obligation to provide
service, review of strike costs as operating expenses, and techniques such
as automatic expense adjustment clauses may have a direct impact on
collective bargaining negotiations and impasse. While the direct authority
of the commission over labor relations is minimal, the exercise of its clearly
granted authority may greatly affect the conduct of labor relations.
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